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Abstract
Aerodynamic and aerothermodynamic comparisons
between flight and ground test for the Space Shuttle
at hypersonic speeds are discussed. All of the compar-
isons are taken from papers published by researchers
active in the Space Shuttle program. The aerodynamic
comparisons include stability and control derivatives,
center-of-pressure location, and reaction control jet in-
teraction. Comparisons are also discussed for various
forms of heating, including catalytic, boundary layer,
top centerline, side fuselage, OMS pod, wing leading
edge, and shock interaction. The jet interaction and
center-of-pressure location flight values exceeded not
only the predictions but also the uncertainties of the
predictions. Predictions were significantly exceeded for
the heating caused by the vortex impingement on the
OMS pods and for heating caused by the wing leading-
edge shock interaction.
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ACIP
ADDB
BET
BF
CP
EST
HRSI
Aerodynamic Coefficient
Instrumentation Package
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vehicle STS-1
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high-temperature reusable surface
insulation
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IMU
NASP
NOM
OEX
OI
OMS
POPU
RCG
RCC
RCS
REYN
SHTNEQ
STS
TPS
T/C
Symbols
Cl B
Cmo
CmBF
Cfl't se
inertial measurement unit
National Aero-Space Plane
nominal
orbiter experiments
operational instrumentation
orbital maneuvering system
push-over-pull-up or pull-up-push-over
reaction-cured glass
reinforced carbon-carbon
reaction control system
free-stream Reynolds number
viscous-shock-layer code
Space Transportation System, prefix
for flight number
thermal protection system
thermocouple
free-stream proportionality factor for
the linear viscosity-temperature
relationship
coefficient of rolling moment due to
angle of sideslip, per deg
coefficient of rolling moment due to
aileron deflection, per deg
coefficient of pitching moment bias
coefficient of pitching moment due to
angle of attack, per deg
coefficient of pitching moment due to
body flap deflection, per deg
coefficient of pitching moment due to
elevator deflection, per deg
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Lyj
M
Moo
 Sjl Soo
Roo
Reoo
Re_
RNS,L
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NS,L
S
St
T
T
Uoo
X
X, x
X/L, xlL
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an
h
k_
kwo
q
q
qc
s/L
t
coefficient of yawing moment due to
angle of sideslip, per deg
coefficient of yawing moment due to
aileron deflection, per deg
height of misaligned tiles, in.
rolling moment due to yaw jet,
ft-lbf per jet
Mach number
free-stream Mach number
viscous interaction parameter
jet-to-free-stream mass flow ratio
free-stream Reynolds number
free-stream Reynolds number
Reynolds number at top of misaligned
tiles
Reynolds number evaluated behind a
normal shock based on orbiter
characteristic length
RNS,L at X/L = 0.2
surface length, in.
Stanton number
temperature, deg F
normalized surface temperature
free-stream velocity, km/sec
viscous interaction parameter,
MooV 
axial coordinate, in.
axial distance from nose of orbiter, m
nondimensional body length
center of pressure in body length
spanwise coordinate, in.
normal acceleration, g
altitude, ft
surface catalytic recombination rate
constant, cm/sec
k_ for oxygen, cm/sec
k_ for nitrogen, cm/sec
convective heat-transfer rate,
Btu/ft2-sec
pitch rate, deg/sec
convective heating rate, Btu/fti-sec
heat-transfer rate, kW/m 2
side fuselage thermocouple location
time, sec
2
a angle of attack, deg
angle of sideslip, deg
6a aileron (differential elevon) deflection,
deg
_e elevator (symmetric elevon) deflection,
deg
eTH total hemispherical emittance
poo free-stream density, kg/m 3
0 pitch angle, deg
Introduction
A continuing interest in advancing the understand-
ing of aerodynamic phenomena using intensive compar-
isons between flight and ground test data exists. This
interest started when the Wright brothers first demon-
strated powered flight 89 yr ago after using their wind
tunnel to make predictions. These continuing com-
parisons have resulted in the steady advancement of
aerodynamics (new phenomenology and modified the-
ory) by forcing agreement between ground and flight
results. This procedure has resulted in more advanced
flight vehicles with ever-increasing economy, improved
safety, and better performance.
Hypersonic flight was demonstrated with the Project
Mercury and X:15 aircraft(North American Avlati0n,
Los Angeles, California)flightprograms in the early
1960's. In the 1960's,severalprograms successfully
generated aerothermodynamic flightdata to improve
the understanding and interpretationoftheoreticaland
ground testresults.The ASSET and PRIME programs
were flown in the early and mid-1960's and provided
aerothermodynamic flightdata for ablativeand metal-
licthermal protectionsystem (TPS) concepts. The
Apollo4,FIRE I,and FIRE IIprograms provided flight
data to validatepredictionsfrom theoreticalradiation
models and arc-jetground test resultsin support of
the return from lunar and planetarymissions.I-2 The
single-flightReentry F vehiclewas also flown in the
1960'swhen itreturned the benchmark data stillused
today forhypersonic boundary-layer transitionpredic-
tionsat Mach numbers (M) up to 20 and altitudes(h)
down to 80,000ft.3
The X-15 research program was flown throughout
the 1960's.4-z This aircraftreturned benchmark hy-
personic data for aircraftperformance, stabilityand
control,materials,shock interaction,hypersonic tur-
bulent boundary layer,skin friction,reactioncontrol
jets,aerodynamic heating,and heat transfer.
The Sandia National Laboratory (Albuquerque, New
Mexico) vehiclesprovided much of the aerothermody-
namic data obtained during the 1970's and 1980's.s
These data have provided new insightsinto the un-
derstanding and modification of existingtheory and
groundtest results. Currently, the Space Shuttle
and the Pegasus vehicle(OrbitalSciencesCorporation,
Fairfax, Virginia) provide aerothermodynamic flight
data for correlationwith ground testresults._-12
This paper discussesthe aerodynamic and aerother-
modynamic comparisons between hypersonic flightand
ground testresultsforthe Space Shuttle.
Reusability and the Space Shuttle
The Space Shuttlebrought to lightmany important
issuesthat must be understood to make economically
viableand fullyreusablespacecrafta reality.Processes
need to be developed that ensure a steady evolutionof
spacecraftwhich can be operated in a manner similar
to aircraft.
Processes have been developed to go from subsonic to
transonic to supersonic flight and for hypersonic glide
vehicles. Future processes will be developed to include
hypersonic alrbreathing vehicles. For example, simu-
lation and ground test facilities led to the X-15 air-
craft. Results from this flight experiment, combined
with the results from entry capsules, reduced the tech-
nical uncertanity associated with hypersonic glide vehi-
cles. This reduction of technical uncertainty, including
46,000 hr of wind-tunnel testing, 13 enabled engineers
to propose and successfully fly the Space Shuttle, the
first generation of operational vehicles that can return
from space and fly like an airplane. 14 The results from
these flights will help engineers design more advanced
vehicles because of further reductions in technical un-
certainty.
In particular, information acquired in flying the
Space Shuttle demonstrates the difficulty in designing
and building an economical, reusable launch vehicle.
The Space Shuttle must essentially be recertified after
every flight even though the vehicle was designed to be
the first reusable space vehicle.
The main argument for reusable spacecraft is an eco-
nomic one, the same reason that expendable trans-
portation systems have not been developed for other
purposes. In addition to squandering limited resources,
such a philosophy for launch vehicles would end with
space cluttered with expendable vehicles, rendering
subsequent flightunnecessarilyhazardous. Consider
what modern airtransport would be likeifthe airlines
disposed of aircraftaftera singleflight.Rather, air-
craftwere designedto be placed inserviceand used re-
peatedly even as manufactures sought to produce bet-
ter and more advanced aircraft.The long-term cost-
benefitsofthispolicyare reflectedinthe priceofmod-
em airtravel.
While currentairlinertechnology iswellunderstood
and welldeveloped,two major technologicalareasmust
be mastered before routine,economical flightto any
desiredorbitcan be achieved. The firstisdevelopment
of a fullyreusable rocket (ultimatelysingle-stage-to-
orbit),and the second isthe assessment ofthe viabil-
ityof alrbreathingscram jettechnology.The firstarea
willprovideeconomy in routinespaceflight,while the
flexibilityof an efficientscramjet willmake any orbit
accessible(decouplingthe desiredorbitfrom the launch
site).
Aerodynamic and aerothermodynamic lessons learn-
ed in testing and flying the Space Shuttle have provided
valuable information that will ease the development of
singie-stage-to-orbit vehicles. In addition to these is-
sues, it is also necessary to examine the economic and
operational issues of going to space routinely. True
reusability characterized by certification similar to that
of an airliner rather than recertification after every
flight is a necessary first step. In addition, such key
reusability technologies as reusable cryogenic materi-
als and lightweight, durable thermal protection systems
need to be developed and evaluated on the ground and
in flight.
The quickest way to examine both economic and
technological issues may be an experimental aircraft
approach. A vehicle similar to the Space Shuttle or
lifting-body would provide a robust testbed and can
be built immediately with off-the-shelf, proven aircraft
and system technologies. Using a configuration similar
to an aircraft, including horizontal vehicle processing
and fault-tolerant approaches, should result in an un-
derstanding of the key processes necessary for an eco-
nomical, reusable spacecraft.
The second major area is developing an operational
scramjet engine. The turbojet engine is over 50 yr old
and has been developed incrementally through scores
of new, flight-proven designs to attain the highly effi-
cient turbojets of today. The supersonic combustion
theory that is requried for a useful scramjet is over
35 yr old, and the concepts have been tested in wind
tunnels for over 20 yr. However, they must be proven
in flight before a scram jet-powered booster becomes vi-
able. Here, too, a rocket-powered testbed vehicle based
on off-the-shelf components could carry various candi-
date scram jet modules into flight. Air-launching the
rocket-powered testbed would simplify the design and
such a testbed could fly to Mach numbers about 10
at desired altitudes for the testing of the interchange-
able scram jet modules. Data acquired in such tests
would, of course, be used to define subsequent modules.
A specialized rocket-powered vehicle could be used to
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verifythe basicscramjetphenomenologywith a few
flight teststhat gatherdataat speedsbetweenMach
I0 and 20.
This sectionhighlightedissuesthat the Space Shut-
tlehas shown need to be addressed beforean econom-
icaland reusablespacecraftcan be realized.The next
sectiondescribes what a valuable aerodynamic and
aerothemodynamic research vehiclethe Space Shuttle
has been.
Space Shuttle Data Presentation
Since 1981 the Space Shuttle (Fig.I) has provided
many opportunitiestocompare ground testswith flight
testsfor aerodynamic and aerothermodynamic data.
Stability and Control Derivatives
The stability and control derivatives of the Space
Shuttle were examined extensively in wind-tunnel test-
ing and in approach and landing tests. The wind-
tunnel data were also incorporated into simulators and
used in the design of the flight control system. No
matter how carefully wind-tunnel tests are performed,
discrepancies sometimes occur between the predictions
and the demonstrated flight characteristics, and the
improved values can only be obtained from the analy-
sis of the flight data.
The wind-tunnel testing provided predictions of
the stability and control derivatives, is Estimates of
the uncertainty in the predictions were also formu-
Many of these comparisons are dis_ in the liter- lated. These uncertainties, called variations, are based
ature. This paper summarizes some of the more sig -: on evaluation of previous correlations between wind-
niflcant results published to date. The comparison is
primarily from the ground test perspective. In a field
as diverse as aerothermodynamics, these comparisons
cover a wide variety of phenomena and their accompa-
nying nomenclature.
Because of length constraints on this paper, the data
comparisons between ground tests and flight tests are
taken exactly as they appeared in the original refer-
enced document. Unfortunately, full interpretations of
the results may not be evident to the nonspecialist,
so it is left to the reader to go to the referenced doc-
uments for more complete treatment of the phenom-
ena. Statements from the referenced documents are
frequently taken nearly verbatim to ensure that they
are consistent with the discussion of the figures and
faithfully represent the conclusions of the referenced
authors. The intent here is to expose the reader to the
variety of meaningful aerothermodynamic ground and
flight test results to show the way flight data (some-
times incidental) can be used to bring to light new in-
terpretations of phenomena.
The flight data that have been used were from the
available Space Shuttle instrumentation. A complete
description of this instrumentation is given in Ref. 15.
This reference discusses the specific orbiter experi-
ments (OEX) that were performed to enhance the un-
derstanding of the aerothermodynamie phenomena as
well as the orbiter operational instrumentation (OI)
that is used on all Space Shuttle flights.
Space Shuttle Hypersonic
Aerodynamics
Many interesting aerodynamic phenomena were in-
vestigated on the Space Shuttle. The most interesting
in terms of the vehicle dynamics are discussed in this
section.
tunnel- and flight-determined coefficients for similar
aircraft. 17 These uncertainties were determined by a
consensus of aerodynamicists and were based on their
evaluations of past correlations with results from ap-
plicable configurations. These uncertainties are felt to
be representative of the span of the uncertainty of pre-
flight predictions.
To support the determination of the stability and
control derivatives, the Space Shuttle carried the Aero-
dynamic Coefficient Instrumentation Package (ACIP)
data collection system aloft, and maneuvers were
performed during reentry for determination of these
derivatives. 15 The Space Shuttle was limited by not
having acceptable flow-angle measurements, that is,
angles of attack and sideslip (a and 13), available above
Mach 3. The flow angles determined from the inertial
measurement unit (IMU) and the Best Estimated Tra-
jectory (BET) Is were only available at 1 sample/see,
too low for dynamic analysis.
The parameter estimation problem (the determina-
tion of the stability and control derivatives from flight)
can be defined quite simply in general terms. The sys-
tem under investigation is assumed to be modeled by a
set of dynamic equations containing unknown parame-
ters. To determine the values of the unknown param-
eters, the system is excited by a suitable input, and
the input and actual system response are measured.
Values of the unknown parameters are then inferred
based on the requirement that the computed model re-
sponse to the given input match the actual, measured
system response. When formulated in this manner, the
unknown parameters can be identified easily by many
methods. In the wind tunnel, the forces and moments
are measured directly. In flight, only the response can
be measured, and the forces and moments are derived
from these responses.
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The primary method of obtaining the stability and
control derivatives from flight data uses the maximum-
likelihood estimation method, is This method also pro-
rides an estimate of uncertainty of each value. Space
Shuttle stability and control derivatives were obtained
with this method. All Space Shuttle flights to date
have been analyzed with this maximum-likelihood es-
timator. The results of the analysis are used to support
envelope expansion and to expand the fore and aft
center-of-gravity limits for future payloads.
Figure 2 shows a longitudinal maneuver from the
second Space Shuttle flight, STS-2, at a dynamic pres-
sure of 17 lb/ft 2 and Mach 23. The figure shows time
histories of the control inputs. These inputs include the
up- and down-jets, body flap (BF), and elevator (sym-
metric elevon) deflection (6e). The figure also shows
some of the dynamic responses of the vehicle, which
are normal acceleration (a,_), pitch angle (0), pitch rate
(q), and angle of attack (_). The solid lines show the
measured vehicle response, and the dotted lines show
the maximum-likelihood-estimated model response.
One difficulty encountered with the Space Shuttle
data was the relatively small amplitude of the maneu-
vers. The input must be large enough to sufficiently
excite the system. For example on the first flight of the
Space Shuttle, STS-1, most of the longitudinal maneu-
vers were very small incidental motions and frequently
were about two orders of magnitude smaller than the
maneuvers typical for most vehicles. The accuracy and
scatter of the derivatives obtained from such small ma-
neuvers were worse than would be expected from larger
intentional maneuvers but were sufficient to establish
some trends. A major issue in the analysis of the longi-
tudinal maneuvers centered around the uncertainty in
the center-of-pressure (CP) location, which is discussed
in the Center-of-Pressure Location subsection. Even
the maneuvers on later flights, designed for derivative
determination, were small. The lateral-directional ma-
neuvers were also quite small.
Figure 3 shows the coefficients of rolling and yaw-
ing moments due to angle of sideslip (Cl_ and C,_ ).19
This figure shows the predicted values with the ex-
pected variation and the flight-derived values with the
estimated uncertainty. The flight Cl# is less negative
than predicted above Mach 10 and more negative be-
low Mach 10. The flight Cn_ values oscillate around the
prediction and stay within the variation, except near
Mach 9.
Figure 4 shows the coefficientsof rollingand yaw-
ing moments due to aileron(differentialelevon) de-
flection(C4_. and C_6°). The flight Cl_° estimates
were smaller than predicted between Mach 1 and 2 and
slightly larger between Mach 14 and 22. The aileron
derivatives for the third Space Shuttle flight, STS-3,
were somewhat larger in magnitude than for STS-1
and 2, probably because of the difference in average
elevon deflection. The predictions had similar differ-
ences. Different surface schedules were used for the
later flights. The flight C_6. estimates matched the
predictions quite well below Mach 12 and were some-
what more negative between Mach 14 and 22.
The reason for the differences between predicted and
flight values for these four key derivatives is unknown.
The differences are attributed to tunnel noise, scale and
real gas effects, and limited numbers of aerodynamic
wind-tunnel tests above Mach 10.
Center-of-Pressure Location
The STS-1 showed that significantly more body-flap
deflection was required to trim the vehicle hypersoni-
cally at an a of 40 ° than was predicted (Fig. 5). 20 Dur-
ing entry, the Space Shuttle is preprogrammed to fly
at a given angle of attack for each Mach number. The
angle of attack is maintained by setting the elevon at a
position scheduled by angle of attack and Mach num-
ber. Then, the body flap is deflected to maintain the
angle of attack. To maintain 40 ° angle of attack hyper-
sonically on STS-1, the body flap was deflected to 16°
instead of the predicted 7 °. Because 9 ° more body-flap
deflection than predicted was required, the body flap
experienced more heating than predicted. The mispre-
diction also resulted in the body flap being deflected
to within 5° of its maximum deflection to trim the ve-
hicle. In addition, more deflection of the body flap
creates more drag, and this increased drag reduces the
cross-range capability.
To examine this misprediction of body-flap trim
position, the location of the CP was investigated.
Figure 6 shows a comparison between flight and pre-
dicted locations of the CP plotted as a function of Mach
number for STS-2. 21 The variations for the predic-
tion are also shown. The flight data were well outside
of the predicted variations. Above Mach 16, the mis-
prediction is about 0.8 percent of the body length, or
10 in. The error must be due to a misprediction of
pitching moment, a misprediction of normal force, or
an error in the location of the flight center of gravity.
Error in the flight center-of-gravity position is less than
1 in. Also, the normal force predictions and flight val-
ues agreed fairly well; therefore, almost all of this 10-
in. error was caused by a misprediction in the pitching
moment. For the Space Shuttle, pitching moment is a
function of coefficients of pitching moment due to an-
gie of attack (Cm.), pitching moment due to elevator
deflection (Cm_,), pitching moment due to body flap
deflection (CmBF), and pitching moment bias (Cmo) at
a given Mach number and angle of attack.
Figure 7 shows the flight-derived estimates of (Tma,
Cm6. , and CmBF from the first three Space Shuttle
flights.AboveMach 16, the predictions and flight es-
timates agree well for these three derivatives. Thus,
the error in body-flap deflection required for trim is
attributable to C_0. The error in Cmo that would ac-
count for the discrepancy shown in Fig. 6 would be
about 0.03 nose up. An error in C_o up to about 0.020
to 0.025 can be attributed to the real gas effects and
Mach number effects, neither of which were completely
simulated in wind tunnels. 2_'23
Between Mach 16 and 8, the CP-position mispre-
diction went from 0.8 percent to less than 0.1 percent
(Fig. 6). Real gas effects become less important as
the Mach number decreases. Some of the error in CP-
location prediction between Mach 16 and 8 may be
attributed to the misprediction in boundary-layer tran-
sition. Preflight predictions indicated that boundary-
layer transition would start to occur at Mach 16, but
the flight data indicated that it transitions quickly at
about Mach 8. Refer to the Boundary-Layer Transition
sub-subsection for a more detailed discussion.
Reaction Control System Jet Interaction
Space Shuttle trajectory during reentry and, there-
fore, its heating profile are controlled through a series
of energy-management bank reversals. The vehicle is
controlled by conventional aerodynamic surfaces and
reaction control system (RCS) jets. The first bank re-
versal on STS-1 resulted in a significantly larger re-
sponse than predicted. 24
Figure 8 shows this flight maneuver at Mach 24 and
compares it with the predicted maneuver. The flight
maneuver resulted in angle of sideslip peaks twice the
size of those predicted and in somewhat higher roll
rates than predicted. Angle-of-sideslip excursions this
large move an area of high heating off the reinforced
carbon-carbon (RCC) nosecap. The motion is also
much more poorly damped than predicted. Compar-
ing the predicted maneuver with the actual maneuver
shows that the flight stability and control derivatives
were significantly different from the predictions. These
stability and control flight maneuvers were analyzed
with the maximum-likelihood method. The resulting
flight-determined estimates were used to significantly
modify the flight simulator.
Simulation studies resulted in modifying the control
inputs for the bank-reversal maneuver on STS-2, as
shown in Fig. 9. Nearly identical maneuvers were flown
on all subsequent Space Shuttle flights. The primary
problem with this and other maneuvers at high al-
titude was obvious from the flight-determined rolling
moment due to yaw jet (Lyj). Figure 10(a) shows
flight-determined and predicted Lyj as a function of
Mach number. TM The variations discussed in the Sta-
bility and Control Derivatives subsection are also evi-
dent on this figure. At the highest Mach numbers, the
value of the flight-determined Lyj was outside these
variations.
To understand the difference between flight and pre-
diction, a brief description of how the predictions were
made is necessary. More complete descriptions are
given in Refs. 25 and 26. The forces and moments
are broken down into three basic components: pure
thrust, jet impingement on the Space Shuttle body,
and jet interaction with the flow around the Space
Shuttle. The jet-interaction term is the one of interest
here, and the remainder of this discussion will concen-
trate on jet-interaction effects. The wind-tunnel tests
were conducted for Mach numbers between 2.5 and 10.
Since the wind-tunnel tests were limited to Mach num-
bers below 10 and dynamic pressures above 75 lb/ft 2,
the predictions for higher altitudes and Mach numbers
were obtained by varying momentum and mass-flow
ratios to include those values applicable for the higher
altitudes.
Figure 10(b) shows the comparison between the
flight-determined and predicted jet-interaction terms.
This figure shows that the flight rolling moment due
to RCS jet interaction, determined with maximum-
likelihood estimation, was smaller than predicted, par-
ticularly above Mach 15 at an altitude greater than
200,000 ft. The explanation for this high-altitude,
jet simulation error lies in the description of the flow
field surrounding the side-jet exhaust. 25 At high alti-
tudes, the vehicle angle of attack is approximately 40 °,
which causes flow separation on the upper surface of
the wing. When the RCS side jets are fired, the ex-
haust enters this separated flow region and pressurizes
the volume defined by the wing upper surfaces and the
flow-separation wake boundaries.
The aerodynamic flow field for this high-altitude
flight environment cannot be properly simulated in the
wind tunnel. For example, at the first bank maneu-
ver (Fig. 8) at Mach 24, the flight dynamic pressure
is 14 lb/ft 2. In these conditions, the wake bound-
ary is much more easily deflected on the flight vehi-
cle than on the wind-tunnel model. This difference in
high-altitude pressure levels strongly influences the dif-
ferences observed between flight and predicted side-jet
rolling moment jet interaction. The phenomena are
described more completely in Ref. 25.
These results show the limitations of the wind-tunnel
database in predicting high-altitude jet effects. The
vehicle wake-flow parameters, such as ambient pres-
sure, cannot be duplicated in the tunnel. 2s Refer-
ence 26 presents the analysis of the limited amount
of wing pressure flight data. The resulting trends for
this analysis were similar to those discussed here for
the maximum-likelihood results. Flight-derived forces
and moments due to up-and-down-firing jets (used
primarilyfor pitch and roll commands at low dynamic
pressure) have been discussed. ]_,_5 The up-and-down-
firing jets exhaust into the wakes generated by the fuse-
lage and wing. The result is similar to that encountered
with the side jets exhausting into the wake from the
wing; the moments are overpredicted. Rolling moment
of the roll jets and the pitching moment of the pitch
jets in flight are smaller than predicted (Fig. 11). The
correlation of these jet interaction terms has the same
limitations as those discussed for rolling moment due
to yaw jet. 25
Space Shuttle Heating
Heating is discussed in three sections: windward,
leeward, and leading edge. The topic is discussed
thusly because different physical phenomena influence
the heating in these three areas.
Windward-Side Heating
The Space Shuttle has two significant causes of wind-
ward heating. The first is the chemical state of the flow,
either equilibrium or nonequilibrium. In nonequilib-
rium flow, surface catalysis becomes an important ele-
ment in heating. The second influence is the state of
the boundary layer, either laminar or turbulent.
Catalytic Effects
The design of the TPS of the Space Shuttle orbiter
was based on predicted aerothermodynamic environ-
ments which were generated assuming that the orbiter
flow field was everywhere in chemical equilibrium. 14
Detailed preflight calculations indicated, however, that
significant chemical nonequilibrium would persist over
the majority of that portion of orbiter entry when sig-
nificant aerodynamic heat transfer occurs. The pa-
rameter which most significantly influences the level
of surface heat transfer in such a flow field is the cat-
alytic efficiency of the TPS surface with respect to the
recombination of dissociated oxygen atoms. The cat-
alytic efficiencyofthe reaction-curedglass(RCG) coat-
ing ofthe orbiterTPS tileswas thought to be relatively
low,based on arc-tunnelexperiments. Therefore,flight
heating rates were expected to be lower than equilib-
rium chemistry predictionsas a resultof the combi-
nation of nonequilibrium chemistry and a non-fully-
catalyticTPS surface. Indeed, surfacetemperatures
were lower than the conservativepredictionson the
earlyflights.2z
In lightofthe great interestin noncatalyticsurface
effects,an experiment was conducted on STS-2 through
-5 to study catalycityY Thermal data forthese espe-
ciallymodified tileswere collectedon flightsSTS-2,
-3, and -5. Selected centerlinetileswith previously
installedinstrumentation were painted or overcoated
with highly catalytic material. The experiment was to
demonstrate the noncatalycity of the baseline tiles by
comparison with the characteristics of the more cat-
alytic modified tiles. The flight data showed that the
surface temperatures of the catalytically coated tiles
(shown normalized) were substantially greater than
those of the baseline tiles (Fig. 12); therefore, the sur-
face catalytic efficiency of the baseline tiles is low.
An unexpected effect occurred during the entries
that serendipitously provided further information into
the catalytic and noncatalytic natures of orbiter
windward-surface heat transfer. 2s This unplanned
experiment manifested itself in significant instanta-
neous changes or jumps in measured TPS surface tem-
peratures (Fig. 13) at affected locations. These jumps
were apparently the result of anomalous deposition of
metallic oxides on portions of the lower surface TPS be-
cause of oxidation of upstream acoustic sensor covers.
These temperature jumps provided evidence of a sud-
den change in catalycity.
Comparing the levels of heat transfer between STS-
2 and -3 for these locations showed an approximately
18 percent greater heating rate level below altitudes
of about 238,000 ft on the later flight (Fig. 14). A
mission-to-mission progressive contamination of the
TPS surface was a contributing factor to this greater
heating rate. This conclusion was bolstered by the
good correlation between the postcontamination data
from STS-2 (round symbols) and the data from STS-3
(square symbols) before additional contamination oc-
curred (Fig. 15).
As the flight program progressed, changes in
the windward surface from flight to flight became
apparent. 27 The surface temperature was increased
at the same flight condition compared with previous
flights. This change led to the conclusion that the
total emittance of the RCG coating decreased with
the number of flights and surface catalytic efficiency of
the coating increased or surface temperature increased
with number of flights. The flight-to-flight changes in
surface temperature can be seen in Fig. 12.
Surface contamination has been proposed as a possi-
ble cause of these changes. The general surface contam-
ination comes from a variety of sources. These sources
include impingement of burning solid rocket fuel and
deposition of sea salt spray while on the pad. In ad-
dition, local contamination comes from the oxidation
during entry of upstream metal acoustic sensor covers.
When the aerothermal design of the Space Shuttle
first started, heating predictions were heavily based on
wind-tunnel data, with modest computational model-
ing of catalycity. 14 After the first five flights, heat-
ing predictions using computational models of the
nonequllibrium chemistry were in use. 2r The ther-
mal response predictions made with these models, in-
eluding ground-test data, design trajectory, and react-
ing boundary-layer computation, agreed well in general
with the flight data (Fig. 16).
Nonequilibrium calculation techniques were used to
predict heat fluxes to the windward side of the Space
Shuttle orbiter. 2_ The techniques were the axisymmet-
tic viscous-shock-layer method, three-dimensional re-
acting Euler equations solutions coupled with axisym-
metric analog boundary-layer method, and nonequi-
librium three-dimensional viscous-shock-layer method.
These calculation methods succeeded in predicting
heating trends but did not predict the measurements
uniformly over the entire windward centerline for all
flight conditions. That is, nonequilibrium methodolo-
gies could predict the heat flux for high-altitude reen-
try, but some improvements were still required. In
particular, the key issue was the modeling of catalytic
efli ciency.
At the current time, the models in use are capable
of good agreement with the flight data as is shown in
Fig. 17. 30-32 The addition of a recent correlation for
oxygen surface recombination gave better overall agree-
ment with the flight data than the extrapolation of
ground-based experimental recombination data. Pre-
dicted centerline and windward-surface heat transfer
were in good agreement with the flight data, and the
predicted trends in heating rates away from the wind-
ward symmetry plane appear correct. Future applica-
tion of the current code for three-dimensional vehicle
analyses appears promising based on such verification.
This progress in modeling is the result of obtaining
flight data from which to infer the catalytic efficiency
of the tiles and increases in computational capability
for model evaluation. This success in modeling the
catalycity of Space Shuttle tiles using flight data in-
dicates that obtaining flight data for other materials
should result in good modeling of their catalyeity.
In addition, the flight data also made it clear that
the catalycity of a reusable vehicle should not be as-
sumed to remain constant. Rather, catalycity may
be changed by the flight process. Contamination (the
melted acoustic covers and the launch plume impinge-
ment), ground handling (the sea spray from the launch
pad environment), and other factors all may change the
properties of the surface.
Boundary-Layer Transition
Knowing the time and positionofthe boundary-layer
transitionisfundamental to determining the heating
on the windward sideof the Space Shuttle.Boundary-
layertransitionstronglycontributesto the heat load of
the vehicle and the instantaneous heating rates. These
two factors are important in determining the thermal
protection requirements of the vehicle.
A major element in boundary-layer transition is the
roughness of the surface, such as the TPS tiles with
which the windward surface is protected. To assess
the effect of tiling patterns for these TPS tiles, a
variety of grooves simulating tile gaps on flat plates
were tested in the wind tunnel. Results showed that
long grooves or gaps parallel to the streamlines pro-
duced more heating in the gaps. Grooves parallel to the
surface streamlines produced strong boundary-layer-
tripping disturbances whereas grooves perpendicular to
the streamlines produced much weaker interactions. 33
From these results, the diagonal tiling pattern was es-
tablished (Fig. 18).
In the original design, the tiled surface was assumed
to be smooth, but actual fabrication revealed that the
surface would be much rougher than planned. 34 The
tiles were paved with nominal gaps of 0.045 in. and had
rounded edges. In addition, the edges of some tiles were
irregular because of manufacturing techniques. Thus,
the surface was quite rough aerodynamically. 33 In fact,
the lower surface with its steps, gaps, and tile irreg-
ularities is an incredibly complex surface in terms of
roughness definition. Measurements of a number of ar-
eas that appeared to be typically rough (Fig. 19) con-
firm this complexity. The profilometer is able to resolve
0.001 in. surface displacements.
The original ground testing, assuming smoother
tiles, was repeated for the rougher actual tiles. These
tests prompted the development of a more refined
aerothermodynamic database with improved predic-
tion technologies. These tests influenced the layout
and roughness criteria for tile installation.
Wind-tunnel tests were performed to examine
boundary-layer transition using a 0.04-scale model with
spherical roughnesses and simulated tiles. In the wind
tunnel, the effects of the surface conditions dominated
the upstream region, and the effects of tunnel noise
dominated the transition process in the downstream
region. These effects suggest that transition predic-
tions would be conservative in the downstream region
and reasonably reliable in the upstream region. 34
Original predictions indicated that transition would
start at the aft end of the vehicle at about 900 sec
and slowly move forward (Fig. 20). In flight, transi-
tion startedmuch laterthan predictedand flashedto
the nose almost instantaneously,as isalsoapparent in
Fig.20.
Figure 21 shows thisrapid transitionmore graphi-
callywith transitionmaps forSTS-2 through STS-5.35
The transitioncontours for the leftside of the Space
Shuttle(the instrumented side)are mapped onto the
Space Shuttle planform for four flight conditions. In
Fig. 21(a), the transition front can be observed to flash
forward instantaneously (i.e., between time (+t)=
76,297 and 76,298 sec) from the aft Of the vehicle to-
ward the nose. Figure 21 shows that the transition
front flashed forward in 4 sec or less on STS-2 through
STS-5. The complexity of the transition contours and
the abrupt manner in which they were moved strongly
indicate that the inflight transition process is domi-
nated by the effects of discrete surface roughness.
On STS-3 (Fig.21(b)) the transition occurred
at about the same flight conditions as on STS-2
(Fig. 21(a)). However, the STS-4 transition (Fig. 21(c))
occurred at a higher Mach number, higher angle
of attack, and lower Reynolds number. On STS-5
(Fig. 21(d)), the transition occurred at intermediate
values of angle of attack and Mach number and at a
substantially lower Reynolds number than on STS-2
and STS-3. These data are not conclusive, but the
trend indicates that in-flight transition, in addition to
being a function of Mach number, may also be a func-
tion of angle of attack; that is, at higher angles of at-
tack the flow transitions at a higher Mach number. Ref-
erence 34 states that between angles of attack of 25 °
and 40 ° , the wind-tunnel data base has indicated very
little effect of angle of attack alone on transition.
Reference 33 notes that on STS-1, the flow transi-
tioned to turbulent at one wing station for 7 sec and
then returned to laminar flow for 26 sec before it finally
transitioned to turbulent flow and remained turbulent
for the remainder of this flight. In this instance, the
angle of attack dipped during the period of relaminar-
ization of the flow. Angle of attack, therefore, may
have contributed to this relaminarization. This result,
with the potential angle-of-attack effect noted previ-
ously, may indicate that the flight data show that in-
creased angle of attack may cause earlier boundary-
layer transition in flight.
The transition from laminar to turbulent flow at the
aft end of the vehicle occurred later in the entry than
expected and produced lower temperatures and total
heat load. as Figure 22 shows the predicted and flight
values of lower-surface temperatures at the 70-percent
location. The delay in transition can be clearly seen in
the delayed increase in temperature.
Based on postflight analysis, the predictions could
apparently have been improved by removing the
original, smooth-surface data from the correlation
parameter because these data were very sensitive to
free-stream noise. However, even the rough-surface
data seemed to be very sensitive to tunnel noise.
The good agreement between the predicted and mea-
sured transition times in such regions as the 10- to 20-
percent centerline suggested that the simulation and
correlation of transition in certain regions was very
good. 33 The regions for which the agreement was
good had the transition process dominated by surface
roughness and shock-layer disturbances at both wind-
tunnel and flight conditions. The two phenomena prob-
ably dominated because of the relatively thin boundary
layer and highly curved bow shock near the forward
part of the orbiter. From the above rationale, the con-
clusion was reached that the wind-tunnel data gener-
ated with effective roughnesses provided good predic-
tions of flight conditions for the forebody. Differences
between predictions and flight values for the aft region
were attributed to tunnel noise.
Leeward-Side Heating
Leeward-side heating is a highly complex three-
dimensional process dominated by separated and reat-
taching flows as well as vortex scrubbing and impinge-
ment. Areas heated by this process include the top and
sides of the fuselage and the orbital maneuvering sys-
tem (OMS) pods. Figure 23 shows the different types
of fuselage side heating caused by lee-side vortex flows.
Top Centerline Heating
Heating on top of the orbiter separated-flow-
dominated fuselage is quite complex, and the upper
fuselage thermal environment is generally characterized
in terms of heating to the leeward centerline. An em-
pirical technique for predicting top centerline heating
on the orbiter was developed. 37 This technique con-
sisted of a modified turbulent swept-cylinder correla-
tion using an effective local sweep angle that was mea-
sured directly from oil-flow patterns from wind-tunnel
tests. These wind-tunnel sweep angles were then ex-
trapolated to account for conditions at flight Reynolds
numbers and Mach numbers. Reference 37, using this
approach, showed that the leeward centerline method-
ology is able to predict the diverse heating environment
represented by the wind-tunnel data.
A relatively simple approach for extrapolating the
leeward centerline heating equation and wind-tunnel
sweep angles to flight conditions was established. The
first step was to establish a procedure for extrapolating
wind-tunnel sweep angles to equivalent flight Reynolds
number values. The next step was to define a criterion
that related the flight environment at each trajectory
point to the proper set of wind-tunnel test conditions.
The final step was to develop a method of correcting for
the effects of the differential between flight Mach num-
bers and the wind-tunnel Mach numbers from which
the flight sweep-angle distribution was extrapolated.
The predictions and flight data compared well for
Mach numbers below 15, but the predictions were
higher than the flight data for Mach numbers above
15 (Fig. 24). 3s-41 One hypothesis for this difference
is that laminar flow existed on the lee side above
Mach 15,whereas the predictionmethodology assumed
turbulent flow. This hypothesis is supported by
Ref. 38,which discussesthe discoveryofa distinctran-
sitionof the leeside flow fieldfrom laminar to turbu-
lent at about Mach 15. This sudden transitionfrom
laminar to turbulentisshown at the bank reversalat
Mach 15 in Fig.24.
Side-Fuselage Heating
An empirical method for predicting side-fuselage
impingement heating was also developed based on
analysisof oil-flowpatterns and phase-change paint
and thermocouple (T/C) heating measurements. The
same type ofturbulentheatingequation that was used
for the top centerlinemodel isused in this method.
The surfaceoil-flowpatterns indicateangle of attack
of the flow on the side fuselageor a sweep angle as
describedin the Top CenterlineHeating subsection.
The sourceof the impinging flow was assumed to be
the shear layerwhich originatesalong a separationline
on the upper surfaceof the strake. Figure 25 shows
the predictedlocationofthe impingement lineand the
locationofthe side-fuselageinstrumentation.
Limited flightdata showed mostly good agreement
with the predictions(Fig.26). The isolatedcaseswhere
the flightdata shows much higher values,or spikes,
have been attributedto embedded vorticesgenerated
by viscous interactionsduring the impingement pro-
cess. These spikeswere alsoseen in the wind-tunnel
data. The embedded vorticesarebelievedto be caused
by boundary-layercross-flowinstabilities.In the wind-
tunnel testing,a sequence of uniformly spaced streaks
in phase-change paint above and originatingfrom the
impingement locationon the sidefuselageofthe model
was seen. Each streakisthought to representa very
thinlineofvorteximpingement which produces locally
higherheating.
OMS Pod Heating
The OMS pod has been investigatedextensivelybe-
cause the heating ofthe pod isa criticalfactorin the
abilityofthe orbitertoflyreduced anglesofattackrela-
tiveto development flightestand currentoperational
levels.42 Extending from the orbiterside makes the
OMS pod extremely susceptibletoflowimpingement or
vortexscrubbing and to damage from debristraversing
along the fuselage(Figs.1 and 23). In allleeward-side
regions strongly influencedby vortex scrubbing, the
wind-tunnel data underpredictedthe flightestdata.42
This scrubbing isreflectedinFig.27,showing both pre-
dictedand flighttemperatures forSTS-2.
Vortex scrubbingisextremely sensitivetosmall vari-
ationsin angle of attack,yaw, and Reynolds number.
In flight,the flow appeared to become attached at a
higherangleof attackand at a lower Reynolds number
than under wind-tunnel conditions. This sensitivity
to angle of attack and flow attachment isparticularly
evident(Fig.27) inthe data collectedinpull-up-push-
over (POPU) maneuvers, which are characterizedby
largevariationsin angleof attack.The change intem-
perature during the POPU at Mach 20 isvery obvi-
ous and itcan alsobe seen that the methodology did
not predictthis sensltivity.36 The methodology did
not predictthis sensitivitybecause the wind tunnel
predictedthat the impingement would occur near 30°
ratherthan at 37° as seen in flight.
Wing Leading-Edge Heating
"Boundary-layer" heating and shock interactionare
the two sourcesof heating ofthe wing leadingedge.43
For lack of a betterterm, we use boundary-la_/erheat-
ing here to mean the heating where there isno shock
interaction.The instrumentation of the leadingedge
was designed to measure the effectsof both types of
heating.
Instrumentation (radiometers) was installed
(Fig.28) at stations40-, 55-, 80-, and 98.6-percent
semispan, and data were collected during the first five
flights. The 40-percent semispan is on the glove, and
the 98.6-percent semispan is at the wingtip. The 55-
percent semispan is in the peak entry heating zone
caused by shock interaction, and the 80-percent semis-
pan is in the maximum entry airload zone. The Wing-
Shock Interaction subsection discusses the 55-percent
shock interaction.
Figure 29 shows the maximum heat rate of the
leading edge, with the predicted values and flight
radiometer data, and the estimated values from the
radiometer data and the model.
Wing Boundary-Layer Heating
The wing leading edge of the Space Shuttle was
aerothermodynamically modeled in a simplified form
as a 45-deg swept cylinder with regions of higher sweep
at the glove and the wing tip. Wind-tunnel data were
used with this model to produce the predictions before
flight. This method did not model the shock interac-
tion at the 55-percent semispan location.
The predicted temperature at the 80-percent semis-
pan (panel 16) matched the flight data extremely
well (Fig. 30). The flight-estimated values based
on the radiometer data were within 2 percent of
the preflight prediction. This good match verified
the usability of swept-cylinder methods outside the
shock-interaction zone.
The heat rates in the glove (represented by the 40-
percent semispan) and the wingtip (the 98.6-percent
10
semispan) were substantially overpredicted. On the
other hand, this overprediction had been expected since
the swept-cylinder approach is known to be conserva-
tive in regions of high sweep.
The onset of boundary-layer transition that was as-
sumed in the prediction would have caused more heat-
ing at the wingtip. However, the actual transition be-
havior was quite different from that predicted, and this
additional heating did not occur. Thus, the existing
wingtip-analysis method was adequate for predicting
flight heating and overpredicted with respect to the
predicted heating because of transition. 43
Wing-Shock Interaction
In addition to the boundary-layer heating that heats
the entire leading edge, bow- and leading-edge-shock
interaction heats the leading edge locally. 43 Analysis
of schlieren data, oil-flow patterns, and heat-transfer
data from wind-tunnel tests indicated that the bow
and leading-edge shock impinged with a resulting third
shock and vortex/jet impinging on the wing. The main
effects of this disturbance were expected to be increased
shock-interaction heating at 55-percent semispan on
the leading edge, earlier transition on the outboard
portions of the wing lower surface, and increased vortex
scrubbing on the outboard wing upper surface.
This shock impingement is difficult to scale from the
wind tunnel to flight, so following- and double-shock
techniques were used to scale wind-tunnel data to pre-
dicted flight conditions. 43 As mentioned in the Wing
Leading-Edge Heating subsection, instrumentation was
installed at 55-percent semispan (panel 9) to measure
the heating because of the shock interaction.
The predicted temperature was 200 OF lower than
that measured in flight during the period of peak heat-
ing (Fig. 31). This higher measured temperature is
confirmed by the temperature distribution shown in
Fig. 32.
On subsequent flights, the temperature in this re-
gion was consistently about 200 °F higher than the
predicted values. This difference confirms the difficulty
of sealing wing-shock interaction from the wind tunnel
to flight.
Concluding Remarks
Correlation and validation of ground test and flight
are used in a complimentary fashion to improve the re-
suits of both. The flight data provide benchmark data
to improve interpretation and corrections to ground
test results. These improved ground test techniques,
coupled with other flight test data, allow improved
vehicles to be designed, built, and analyzed with re-
duced technical risk.
Many examples show that the predictions from
ground-based data were conservative. Such results are
expected as uncertainty should result in conservative
predictions. The objective is to design the flight vehicle
with adequate margins to reduce the risk to the vehi-
cle. At the same time, these margins must be kept low
enough that the flight vehicle is versatile, and its use-
ful flight envelope can be expanded during flight test.
Of course, much is learned in the validation of ground
test with flight data even if the prediction agrees com-
pletely with flight. This agreement further reduces the
margins required for future flight vehicles.
In some cases, however, even the conservative ground
test predictions are exceeded. When this happens
much more is learned, assuming that the vehicle sur-
vives, as we may become aware of new phenomena or of
the increased importance of old phenomena. The Space
Shuttle exceeded the conservative predictions and their
associated uncertainties in four primary areas. These
areas include the center-of-pressure location, reaction
control system jet interaction with the flow over the ve-
hicle, angle of attack at which the vortex impinged on
the OMS pod, and wing leading-edge shock-interaction
heating. None of these cases where the conservative
predictions were exceeded by the flight values resulted
in the loss of the vehicle. Survival of the vehicle is
a tribute to the overall design philosophy, including
ground test predictions, and to the designers of the
Space Shuttle.
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